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Abstract
In any non-trivial state, policies decided at the top levels of government are ad-
ministered by middle-level bureaucrats. I examine whether this agency problem can
contribute to explaining state failure in matters of provision of public goods. I ﬁnd
some theoretical arguments to support the view that failure is more likely in states
whose top rulers have predatory motives. When the bureaucrats’ cost of providing the
public good is their private information,rulers must givethem incentive rents to achieve
truthful revelation. Predatory rulers are less willing to part with such rents; therefore
they tolerate more downward distortion in the provision of public goods to reduce the
required rent-sharing. When the bureaucrats’ actions are also unobservable, there is a
synergistic interaction between more benevolent rulers and more caring or professional
bureaucrats. However, these eﬀects manifest themselves diﬀerently and to diﬀerent
degrees under diﬀerent conditions of information. Therefore precise explanations or
predictions in individual instances require context-speciﬁc analyses.
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1Fantastic grow the evening gowns;
Agents of the Fisc pursue
Absconding tax-defaulters through
The sewers of provincial towns.
...
Caesar’s double-bed is warm
As an unimportant clerk
Writes I DO NOT LIKE MY WORK
On a pink oﬃcial form.
- W. H. Auden, The Fall of Rome
1 Introduction
“Nation-states exist to provide a decentralized method of delivering political (public) goods
to [their citizens].” So begins the analysis by Rotberg (2004, p. 2) of governments’ failures
to fulﬁll this basic purpose. His list of public goods span a broad range: security of persons
and property, institutions of dispute resolution, institutions of political participation, central
banking, methods of regulating the use of common resources, health care, education, and
physical infrastructure. Government failure in these respects leads to economic failure. Inse-
curity of property and contracts, poor infrastructure, poor health and education, all reduce
the return to private eﬀort and destroy private incentives.
Rotberg (ibid, pp. 4–10) gives a taxonomy and characterization of various degrees of state
failure, labeling the successively worse cases as weak, failing, failed, and collapsed states; for
brevity I will use the term failing states. He ﬁnds the phenomenon pervasive in today’s
world. Applying his criteria for the various degrees of failure, he counts 30 weak states, 7
failing states, 2 failed states, and 3 collapsed states (ibid, pp. 46–49).
Rotberg also identiﬁesand discusses various correlates and causes of state failure. Internal
conﬂict and violence rank high in this list. However, Rotberg recognizes (ibid,p .5 )t h a t
all states contain heterogenous interests, and the failure to manage such conﬂicts of interest
is “more a contributor to, than a root cause of, nation-state failure.” It acquires greater
importance as one proceeds to worse levels of failure, so it is perhaps best seen as a part of
a cumulative process of mutual feedbacks between conﬂict and failure.
Next comes the intent of the rulers; “[i]n most failed states, regimes prey on their own
constituents” (ibid, p. 6). Economists have also recognized that the benevolent government
2that graces many of their models, maximizing social welfare or total social surplus, is at best
an ideal against which to contrast actual governments. Buchanan, Herschel Grossman and
others have accustomed us to the idea that predatory governments extracting economic rents
from the citizenry are perhaps closer to reality than the benevolent ones of the traditional
normative theory. Shleifer and Vishny (1998) memorably call this the “grabbing hand” view
as opposed to the traditional “helping hand” view of government.
Casual thinking might suggest that the ruler’s predatory intent by itself explains state
failure; why would a grabbing hand feed public goods to its victims? However, Olson (1993)
has taught us that a robber government need not fail when it comes to provision of public
goods. If the government is suﬃciently stable in its rule to take a long term view, or in
Olson’s terminology, it is a “stationary bandit” instead of a short-term “roving bandit,” it
may recognize that its best policy is to “cultivate” the private economy like any productive
asset, producing more in order to extract more. Indeed, Coasian intuition suggests that a
predatory ruler should strive to maximize total economic output. Olson argues that even his
“stationary bandit” will fail to achieve the level of eﬃciency that a democratic government
would, because the citizenry that constitutes or controls the government takes more fully into
account, or encompasses, the distortionary eﬀects of taxation. However, he simply assumes
that taxation must be proportional at a constant rate t, and fails to consider the possibility
that less distorting instruments may be available to the predatory ruler.
A better explanation comes from endogenizing the time horizon of the predatory ruler.
Olson’s classiﬁcation between stationary and roving bandits is exogenous. But in reality the
ruler’s actions may aﬀect his longevity; in particular, public goods that improve the citizens’
abilities to obtain information and communicate with others may make them better aware
of the ruler’s shortcomings and facilitate their collective action to topple him. Then the
ruler will underprovide such public goods. The classic example of this is the advice that
the Mobutu Sese Seko, for many years dictator of Zaire (Congo) supposedly gave to a fellow
dictator: “Never to build any roads; that will only make it easier for your enemies to reach
the capital.” Robinson (2001) analyzes this issue and oﬀers several examples.
I will show in the concluding section how this can be incorporated in my model, but my
main focus in this paper is diﬀerent. It arises from the third characteristic of failing states
3identiﬁed by Rotberg, namely “[t]he bureaucracy has long ago lost its sense of professional
responsibility” (Rotberg, p. 7). However, bureaucracy is unavoidable for the governance, or
even for misgovernance, in all but tiny states. In any non-trivial state, the process of policy
implementation is too complex for the top levels of government to exercise their authority
over the citizens directly, regardless of whether their intentions are benevolent or predatory,
and whether they wish to supply public goods or to collect taxes. Instead, they must carry
out their policy using middle and lower level agents. Rotberg assumes this implicitly in the
quote at the start of this section, when he speaks of states as “a decentralized method of
delivering political (public) goods” (emphasis added).
Some examples of supposedly absolute rulers illustrate the point. Louis XIV of France
embodied “royal absolutism”; he was supposed to be “a supreme potentate whose wish
was law.” But in reality, “[i]t was not like that. Consider ﬁrst the dead weights on his
activities ... the 60,000 or so inferior oﬃcials who could not be sacked and at their low-ﬂying
level were, really, independent of the king” (Finer, 1997, p. 1332). Even Stalin was not
omnipotent (Service, 2004, p. 8). Gregory and Harrison (2005) review and discuss extensive
recent archival research highlighting the numerous and complex problems of information,
incentives, and rent-seeking he faced in his “hierarchy of ‘nested’ dictatorship.” Finally,
Harford (2006, pp. 182–189) gives a picturesque and instructive account of state failure in
Cameroon. He accepts that the government led by Paul Biya acts like a bandit, but asks
why it does not rob the country eﬃciently even though Biya’s stay in power is long and
seemingly permanent: he gets about 75% of the vote in passably fair elections. Harford’s
answer is that “Biya is not in control as much as it ﬁrst appears ... [W]hether or not Biya is
the bandit-in-chief, there are many petty bandits to satisfy.” Biya is the principal and the
petty bandits are his agents, but he cannot control them perfectly.
The need to operate through intermediate layer or layers of administration creates the
usual agency problems for the rulers. They have to rely on the bureaucracy to access the
information that is essential for their policymaking, and can monitor the bureaucrats’ actions
only by using other bureaucrats.
The implementation of policy is therefore a principal-agent problem, the top ruler being
the principal and the bureaucrats the agents. The principal designs the policy mechanism
4to optimize his own objective, subject to the agent’s incentive and participation constraints.
As usual, the optimal solution requires sharing some rent with the agent to give him the
incentiveto reveal the information and to take the appropriate actions. The principal’s desire
to keep down the cost of giving up this rent also entails some modiﬁcation or distortion of the
actions themselves. How much rent the principal ﬁnds it optimal to give to the agent, and
how much distortion he tolerates to keep down the rent transfer, depends on the principal’s
objectives. The agent’s malfeasance depends on the degree of his selﬁshness versus his
innate caring for the citizen’s welfare, arising from either benevolence or professionalism.
Given these distinctions, we should expect the extent of distortion and maldistribution to
diﬀer in diﬀerent states.
Thus we have a new question: Are agency problems in dealing with bureaucrats worse
for a predatory ruler than for a benevolent ruler? This can happen in two ways. First, a
predatory ruler may have stronger motivations to limitthe rent givenaway to his bureaucrats,
and therefore may be more willing to tolerate distortions in order to reduce the rent transfer.
Second, interactions arise endogenously if benevolent rulers can selectively attract unselﬁsh
or professional bureaucrats, whereas predatory rulers attract selﬁsh ones. Such interactions
between the ruler’s intent and agency problems are the focus of this paper.
I take the ruler’s objectives to be exogenous (embodied in equation (5) below), and
compare the outcomes under rulers with diﬀerent exogenously speciﬁed objectives. This
diﬀers from other models of politics in some respects.
The focus of much of formal political theory, explicitly or implicitly, is on endogenous
explanation of the top ruler’s objectives – it models the processes of elections, legislative
bargaining, lobbying, and so on, which determine how and what kind of top-level ruler
emerges. But most of that theory implicitly assumes that once the political process is
complete, the implementation of the ruler’s optimal policy will be a relatively routine matter.
In this sense, this paper can be regarded as complementary to that literature.
A recent line of formal political modeling assumes that all rulers are at heart bandits
seeking to maximize their own take from the economy; diﬀerent types of polities diﬀer
only in the constraints on the rulers’ choices. Of the many examples of this, I mention one
especially prominent, namely Bueno de Mesquita and coauthors (2003). The key magnitudes
5in their theory are the sizes of the set of people who have a say in choosing the rulers, called
the selectorate, and of the subset that is crucial for maintaining the rulers in power, called
the winning coalition. If the winning coalition is small relative to the selectorate, as in an
autocracy, the ruler is secure in power; the current winning coalition is quiescent, knowing
that the ruler can easily construct another coalition to replace it. Such a ruler and his clique
can enjoy private goods without the need to provide many public goods. But if the winning
coalition is large relative to the selectorate, as in a democracy, then replacing the winning
coalition is diﬃcult and the ruler’s choices are constrained by the need to reward the existing
coalition to keep it happy. It is very costly to do so by providing private goods to the large
winning coalition; therefore such a ruler will provide more public goods.
My model diﬀers from this in two ways. A relatively minor diﬀerence is that the public
goods in their theory enter directly into the payoﬀ function of the selectorate, whereas those
in my model, and in most of the discussion of failing states, they are intermediate public
inputs that are complementary to private eﬀort in providing the ultimate consumption goods.
A moreimportant substantive diﬀerenceconcerns the objectivefunctionof the ruler. I believe
that the assumption that rulers are interested only in oﬃce, or are all bandits at heart and
are constrained only by the threats of rebellion, is too extreme. History is full of examples of
rulers who idealistically valued their citizens’ welfare to varying extents, and theory should
incorporate this in the rulers’ objectives.
In the same vein, I should stress that in this paper the focus is on the distinction between
diﬀerent objectivesof the state (benevolent versus predatory), not on the distinction between
diﬀerent forms of the state (democracy versus dictatorship or oligarchy, for example). There
is a correlation between the two dimensions of objectives and form, but it is not perfect. So
benevolent dictatorial or authoritarian regimes that do a good job of providing many public
goods for their subjects do not constitute counterexamples to the model.
The agency problems inherentin economicpolicyhaveof course been analyzed extensively
in the literature, but mostly within the context of a social-welfare maximizing top level. This
includes most three-tier models of corruption, e.g. Becker and Stigler (1974), Tirole (1986),
Banerjee (1997) and Guriev (2004), which consider how far a benevolent ruler can control
corruption among middle-level bureaucrats. It also includes most Ramsey-Boiteaux type
6models of regulation, extensively reviewed and discussed in Laﬀont and Tirole (1993), where
the top tier has the “socially correct” objective function, with diﬀerent speciﬁcs of who is
supposed to do what and who has what information.
Laﬀont (2000) regards politicians as selﬁsh and corruptible; his top-level principal is the
constitution designer who lays down the rules, constraints, incentive schemes, and checks
and balances for politicians, to maximize the fully benevolent objective of maximizing total
social surplus, subject to the constraints on instruments arising from various information
asymmetries. However, the assumption of benevolence at the top levels of the government
seems unrealistic for weak or failing states, and perhaps also for many other states. Many
states have a grand-sounding or even well-intentioned constitution, but it is merely a fa¸ cade
behind which the actual top-level rulers make policy at will. Sometimes they can even
change the constitution to suit their needs or whims. Therefore the case of predatory rulers
is worth more attention in the agency context. Shleifer and Vishny (1998) recognize that
governments are not benevolent, and that much of the malfeasance they discuss takes place
at the level of the bureaucracy, but they generally regard the government as a single entity
and do not analyze the agency problems that arise in multi-tiered governments.
I conduct the analysis using a very simple three-tier model that departs from the basic
structure of Laﬀont, Tirole et al. only in the objectives of the top-level ruler and the middle-
level bureaucrat. In the next section I describe this structure; the sections that follow
consider diﬀerent conditions of information and monitoring. In the text I state and interpret
the results. The mathematical derivations are in an appendix at the end, whose sections
carry the same numbering and titles as the corresponding sections in the text.
Here are some of the main results from the model.
[1] If the ruler has full information about the bureaucrat’s technology (or cost function)
for providing the public good, and can observe all of the bureaucrat’s actions – the amount
of the public good he provides, the amount of fee he extracts from the citizen, and the
sum he remits to the ruler – then the ruler, regardless of his own benevolence or lack of it,
implements the eﬃcient level of the public good. This is Olson’s stationary bandit acting in
an optimal Coasian manner. The only reason to depart from this under full information is
7the existence of a dead-weight loss in transfers for some other reason; Olson assumes this by
stipulating a proportional income tax.
[2] If the ruler cannot observe the bureaucrat’s type, but can observe his actions, then
the optimal policy involves a downward distortion in the quantity of public good supplied by
the higher-cost types of bureaucrats. The distortion is bigger in the case of a fully predatory
ruler than in the case of a fully benevolent ruler; in this sense we should expect predatory
states to be more prone to failure when it comes to providing public goods. As an extreme
case, if there are no dead-weight losses of monetary transfers, then a fully benevolent ruler
does not distort the level of the public good downward at all, but a predatory ruler does
so. More generally, under a ruler who wants to extract from the citizen, the distortion is
independent of the degree of the bureaucrat’s concern for the citizen, and so is the amount
of rent the high-cost type bureaucrat gets. Under a ruler who is generous toward the citizen,
the distortion is perhaps paradoxically larger when the bureaucrat’s concern for the citizen
is greater, and such a bureaucrat gets less rent. Thus, in this information condition, the
intuition that a generous ruler will be able to attract more concerned bureaucrats is not
borne out. However, the citizen and the ruler alike achieve higher levels of utility when the
bureaucrat has a greater degree of concern.
[3] Next I consider the cases where the ruler does not know the bureaucrat’s cost type,
and can observe only one of the two actions of the bureaucrat. First suppose the quantity
of public good the bureaucrat provides to the citizen is hidden from the ruler, but the fee
the bureaucrat extracts from the citizen is observable. This is the case perhaps closest to
reality in many situations – the quantity and especially the quality of public goods is many-
dimensional and hard to monitor; ﬁnancial transactions are more amenable to reporting
and auditing procedures. In this case, an extractive ruler can achieve the same outcome
as if the quantity of the public good were observable (which admittedly has a substantial
downward distortion as was mentioned in item[2] above) by hiring a bureaucrat with minimal
direct concern for the citizen’s welfare, and forcing him to supply the public good solely to
ensure that the fee mandated by the ruler’s mechanism can be extracted from the citizen
consistently with the citizen’s participation constraint. It is actually better for such a ruler
if the bureaucrat has little or no direct concern for the citizen’s welfare, and the bureaucrat’s
8rent is independent of his degree of concern for the citizen. A highly generous ruler, on
the other hand, does better to rely on the bureaucrat’s innate concern for the citizen, and
in this situation we ﬁnd a remarkable conﬂuence of interests – the citizen, the bureaucrat,
and the ruler are all better oﬀ when this degree of concern is higher. Therefore in this
information condition we do have reasons to expect a synergistic matching of predatory
rulers with uncaring bureaucrats, and of generous rulers with caring bureaucrats. Moreover,
the predatory ruler has greater motive to distort the quantity of public goods downward.
Thus Rotberg’s observation cited above, that in failing states the bureaucracy “has long ago
lost its sense of professional responsibility,” may arise because predatory rulers want it to be
so.
[4] Now suppose the fee is unobservable because the bureaucrat can extract hidden pay-
ments from the citizen, but the public good is observable. Again an extractive ruler can
replicate the outcome with observable fees, because he can calculate and therefore knows the
maximum fee the bureaucrat can and will extract while satisfying the citizen’s participation
constraint. But a generous ruler does not like such an outcome. He can achieve beneﬁt for
the citizen only if he can hire a bureaucrat with a really high degree of concern for the citizen,
perhaps a non-governmental organization with outside resources. Then he can exploit the
situation and achieve a level of the public good that is ideal from the citizen’s perspective.
[5] Finally, suppose the ruler can only observe the amount the bureaucrat remits to him,
but does not know the bureaucrat’s cost type and can observe neither the quantity of the
public good he provides to the citizen nor the fee he extracts from the citizen. In this case
the bureaucrat acts like a Coasian contractor with the citizen, providing an eﬃcient quantity
of the public good. A bureaucrat without excessive concern for the citizen extracts all of the
consumer’s surplus, and the ruler can in turn extract what the high-cost type of bureaucrat
gets. A generous ruler can achieve beneﬁt for the citizen only by hiring a bureaucrat with a
really high degree of concern for the citizen, perhaps a non-governmental organization with
outside resources.
Thus we do ﬁnd some support for the idea that predatory states are likely to exhibit
a greater degree of failure. Moreover, as informational limitations become more severe, it
becomes more important for a predatory ruler to hire selﬁsh bureaucrats, and it becomes
more likely that benevolent rulers and caring bureaucrats will have a symbiotic relationship.
9However, whether the problem of state failure – poor provision of public goods – is
aggravated by the presence of the tier of agency between the ruler and the citizen depends
on the precise information condition. For example, in the very worst condition when the ruler
cannot observe any of the bureaucrat’s actions, the bureaucrat acts as a Coasian contractor
or an Olsonian stationary bandit to provide eﬃcient levels of the public goods, but takes
away all of the consumer’s surplus by charging a high fee. Therefore predicting state failure
from the ruler’s or the bureaucrat’s motives is not simple, and needs careful case-speciﬁc
analysis.
These results obtain even in my extremely simple and basic model of agency. In the
concluding section I will suggest extensions to examine some other dimensions of agency
from these perspectives.
2 The structure of the model
The model has three participants: the citizen, the bureaucrat, and the ruler. The ruler is the
principal and the bureaucrat is his agent. Of course in reality there are numerous citizens
and many bureaucrats. Some aspects of this multiplicity are easy to accommodate within
my model; thus the costs and evaluation criteria with many citizens and bureaucrats can be
handled by suitably scaling the relevant parameters (γ, β, ρB and ρC below). The citizen
should be thought of as a representative of his class, but that precludes consideration of
distributive issues. The bureaucrat may likewise be a representative, although the simulta-
neous existence of several agents creates opportunities for the ruler in the form of relative
performance schemes that are brieﬂy discussed in the concluding section and form part of
the agenda for future research.
The ruler sets up the policy mechanism subject to the bureaucrat’s incentive and par-
ticipation constraints. There is also a participation constraint for the citizen; this may be
interpreted as the payoﬀ level below which the citizenry is likely to rebel. The objective
functions of the ruler and the bureaucrat may take some account of the citizen’s welfare;
these will be speciﬁed shortly.
The bureaucrat supplies a public good K to the citizen at a cost
1
2 γK 2. In later sec-
tions γ will be the bureaucrat’s private information, and the quantity of the public good
10he supplies may also be unobservable to the ruler. The ruler must ensure fulﬁllment of the
bureaucrat’s participation constraint, which may reﬂect the bureaucrat’s alternative employ-
ment opportunities in the private sector or even in some other country, or, especially if the
bureaucracy is taken to include the military, it may be the level of utility below which the
bureaucrat would rebel.
I am assuming that the bureaucrat is the only person who can supply the public good. If
there is a monopolist private supplier, procurement from him constitutes a formally identical
problem. However, if there are competing suppliers, this is like multiple bureaucrats supply-
ing diﬀerent public goods that are perfect substitutes, so privatization using an auction or
similar mechanism can act like yardstick competition among bureaucrats; see the concluding
section for a brief discussion of this generalization.
The citizen supplies labor L at a subjective cost 1
2 L2 to produce gross output Q =
min(K,L). Thus I am assuming that the public good and the citizen’s labor are perfect
complements. This captures in the sharpest and simplest way the idea that if the state
supplies less of the public good, the citizen’s private economic incentives are also weakened.
The qualitative results will generalize to less extreme complementaritybetween the two. The
citizen also has a participation constraint; this captures the need to ensure his survival or
to prevent his emigration, or the level of utility below which the citizens would rebel. I will
discuss this in more detail later.
There are ﬁnancial transfers. Denote the amount the bureaucrat receives from the citizen
by F, and the amount the ruler receives from the bureaucrat by R. The ruler may value R
for private consumption as in the case of Mobutu and many other dictators; however, Stalin
and some others used it for investment (Gregory and Harrison, 2005, p. 741), sometimes in
projects valued for the prestige they gave to the ruler or the country, or for military expen-
ditures. I require R ≥ 0; the zero can be replaced by any constant, positive or negative, with
no signiﬁcant change in the analysis. The constraints on F are less clear. The bureaucrat’s
cost of supplying the capital good may be a monetary cost that must be covered. Alterna-
tively, the cost may be a utility cost, but the bureaucrat’s net monetary receipts must be
non-negative. Sometimes, the bureaucrat may actually be a non-governmental organization
with access to outside resources that can be transferred to the citizen or milked by the ruler.
I will consider various possibilities at appropriate times in the analysis.
11Under fully ideal conditions, namely a benevolent ruler, complete information, and non-
distorting transfers, the total social surplus is maximized by setting L = K = Q,a n d
















The bureaucrat is allowed a fee that exactly compensates him for his cost, and the ruler
extracts nothing from the bureaucrat. The maximized total social surplus is 1/[2(1 + γ)].
In reality, various problems preclude attainment of this ideal, and in this paper I focus
on two:
[1] Transfers from the citizen to the bureaucrat and from the bureaucrat to the ruler may
occur in leaky buckets. I assume that to deliver F to the bureaucrat, the citizen must pay
(1+λC)F, and to deliver R to the ruler, the bureaucrat must pay (1+λB)R,w h e r eλC and
λB are exogenous parameters. This closely follows, as does much of my model, Laﬀont (2000,
pp. 23-27) and Laﬀont and Tirole (1993, pp. 55-63). The standard motivation for λC > 0
in the literature is that it is the shadow cost of public funds, stemming from some (here
unspeciﬁed) Mirrlees-type model of informational limitations in taxation. The motivation
for λB > 0 is more complex; it may be the cost of hiding side-transfers through gifts or perks,
or psychic costs of illegal or unethical behavior. In a thoroughgoing kleptocracy the ruler and
the bureaucracy may face no such costs and λB may be close to zero. However, a kleptocratic
ruler may have to maintain a special army or praetorian guard to protect himself and his
wealth, and the costs of this may be captured in λB. I leave the endogenization of these
parameters outside the model, even though it would be preferable to explain the leakiness.
However, I do allow the special cases where λB and/or λC equal zero. My main purpose is to
contrast predatory and benevolent rulers. I will show that when the ruler has at least some
predatory purpose, agency remains a problem and the ruler’s complete-information ideal is
unattainable even if λC = λB = 0. By contrast, I will conﬁrm that in conventional normative
models of policy where the top ruler wants to maximize social welfare, leakiness is essential;
the agency problem entails no cost and the ﬁrst-best is attainable if λC = λB =0 .
12[2] The bureaucrat’s cost parameter γ may be his private information. As in Laﬀont
(2000, pp. 23-27) and Laﬀont and Tirole (1993, pp. 55-63), I assume that the bureaucrat can
be one of two types L and H, with probabilities θL and θH, and cost parameters γL <γ H,
respectively. Also, the bureaucrat’s choice of K may or may not be observable to the ruler.
Thus the agency problem may involve both moral hazard and adverse selection. I examine
various possibilities. Where distinction between types and information asymmetry are not
pertinent issues, I suppress the subscript on γ for notational convenience.
When the dead-weight losses from the leaky bucketsenter the picture, the citizen’ssurplus
is
SC = K −
1
2 K
2 − (1 + λC) F, (2)
and the bureaucrat’s surplus is
SB = F − (1 + λB) R − 1
2 γK
2 . (3)
The citizen’s payoﬀ or utility UC is simply his surplus. However, the bureaucrat, whether
from benevolence or from professionalism, mayinternalize some of the citizen’spayoﬀ. There-
fore I write the bureaucrat’s payoﬀ or utility as
UB = SB + βS C (4)
where β ≥ 0 is a parameter. The top-level ruler may internalize some of the citizen’s and
the bureaucrat’s surpluses. I write the ruler’s payoﬀ or utility as
UR = R + ρB SB + ρC SC , (5)
where ρB,ρ C ≥ 0 are parameters.1
In reality, some of these concern parameters, especially β and ρB, will be endogenous as
the ruler chooses his bureaucrats. I will comment on this at various points, but leave the
full endogenization for future research.
1I have assumed that the ruler’s utility depends on the bureaucrat’s surplus, not on the bureaucrat’s
utility. However, the two formulations are equivalent with simple redeﬁnitions of the parameters. Thus, if
UR = R + ρ
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we need only set ρB = ρ 
B and ρC = ρ 
C + βρ  
B.
13The bureaucrat and the citizen both have participation constraints. In most of the
analysis, I normalize the right hand side of each constraint (the outside opportunity or
the minimum utility needed to ensure survival or prevent rebellion) to zero. Therefore the
bureaucrat’s participation constraint is
UB ≥ 0, (6)
and the citizen’s is
UC ≥ 0. (7)
The choice of zero instead of some other constant is harmless, but assuming that the right
hand side is constant independent of the ruler’s actions is restrictive and precludes the cases
like Mobutu’s, where an increase in K would tighten the participation constraints. In the
concluding section I will show how this can be handled by a slight modiﬁcation of the model.
The conventional model where the ruler is fully benevolent and the bureaucrat is purely
selﬁsh has ρB = ρC =1a n dβ = 0. The case where the ruler is purely predatory and the
bureaucrat is purely selﬁsh corresponds to ρB = ρC = β = 0. I will consider the general
case, with only two maintained restrictions:
[1] Limit to the bureaucrat’s concern for the citizen: The bureaucrat is not so unselﬁsh
that he would pass up the opportunity to collect money from the citizen using the leaky
bucket, but with no other costs or consequences. Since a unit of money raises the bureaucrat’s
surplus by 1, but lowers the citizen’s surplus by (1 + λC) which the bureaucrat values at β
per unit, my assumption becomes
β (1 + λC) < 1. (8)
[2] Limit to the ruler’s nepotism: The ruler’s utility rises when less money is transferred
from the citizen to the bureaucrat via the leaky bucket, leaving all other things unchanged.
Considering the ruler’s valuations of the consequences of such a transfer, this assumption
translates into the inequality
ρB <ρ C (1 + λC). (9)
The ﬁrst of these assumptions seems quite realistic, but some middle-level policy imple-
menting agents may be non-governmental organizations, especially foreign ones, that have
14great innate concern for the citizens’ welfare. The second is also intuitive so long as the bu-
reaucrat is a hireling to whom the ruler has no special attachment. Both assumptions hold
in the conventional case where the ruler is fully benevolent and the bureaucrat is selﬁsh;
both also hold, the second weakly so, in the case where the ruler is totally predatory and
the bureaucrat is selﬁsh. The second may fail in a nepotistic situation where the bureaucrat
is the ruler’s relative or friend.2 Therefore, although I will maintain both assumptions in
most of my analysis unless otherwise stated, in some appropriate contexts I will consider the
opposite cases.
A third relationship among these parameters proves important as a dividing line between
cases in the analysis that follows. Consider taking one unit of money from the citizen and
passing it to the ruler via the bureaucrat. Because of the leaky buckets, the ruler receives
1/[(1+λB)(1+λC)]. He also loses utility ρC because of the reduction in the citizen’s surplus.
The bureaucrat’s surplus does not change, but his utility goes down by β.T h i s d o e s n o t
directly aﬀect the ruler’s utility. But suppose the bureaucrat is being kept down to his
participation constraint. Then the ruler must extract β less from the bureaucrat to keep
meeting that constraint. This has a direct cost β/(1 + λB) to the ruler. Also, it increases
the bureaucrat’s surplus by β and therefore the ruler’s utility by ρB β.
Taking all these eﬀects into account, the ruler wants to extract money from the citizen








β (1 + λC)+( ρC − ρB β)( 1+λB)(1+λC) < 1. (10)
I will call this the extractive case, and its opposite the generous case. The conventional model
where the ruler is fully benevolent and the bureaucrat is totally selﬁsh obviously belongs to
the generous category.
2A relative or friend may in turn care about the ruler’s payoﬀ; successive rounds of such mutual inter-
action can be summed and the reduced form considered, much as one calculates direct and indirect labor
requirements in input-output theory by inverting the (I − A) matrix. One may think that the second as-
sumption is also invalid if the bureaucracy includes the military that may threaten the ruler’s own position,
but that should be taken care of in specifying the right hand side of the participation constraint which I
have normalized to zero. This possibility is therefore already included in my formulation.
15Each of the ﬁve sections that follow considers one information condition. The conditions
are as follows:
1. Full information – The ruler can observe the bureaucrat’s type as well as actions.
2. The ruler cannot observe the bureaucrat’s cost type L or H, but can observe all
actions: the amount of the public good K he supplies, the amount of money F he extracts
from the citizen, and the amount R he remits to the ruler.
3. The ruler cannot observe the bureaucrat’s type or the provision of the public good K,
but can observe the ﬁnancial transactions F and R.
4. The ruler cannot observe the bureaucrat’s type or the fee F that the bureaucrat
extracts from the citisen, but can observe the provision of the public good K, and his own
remittance R.
5. The ruler cannot observe the bureaucrat’s type or either of his actions K, F dealing
with the citizen, but can observe the remittance R he receives from the bureaucrat.
In each case the ruler solvesa mechanism design problem, and the information-constrained
optimum also depends on whether the ruler is generous G or extractive E. To distinguish
the optimal K, F and R in all these situations, I will use the information condition and the
ruler’s motive as superscript labels, and the bureaucrat’s type as a subscript label. For ex-
ample, K2G
L is the amount of the public good that is supplied when the bureaucrat’s actions
but not type are observable, the ruler is generous, and the bureaucrat is the low-cost type.
The basic intuition why the information-constrained optimum entails a downward distor-
tion of the amounts of the public good should be familiar from numerous similar problems
in economics, for example Baron and Myerson (1982), and from Laﬀont and Tirole (1993)
and Laﬀont (2000), on which my paper is based. If the low-cost bureaucrat pretends to be
high-cost, he will have to supply KH of the public good, and be compensated as if his cost
were high, but will therefore make an extra proﬁt
1
2 (γH − γL)(KH)2.H em u s tb eg i v e na t
least this much rent to overcome this temptation and achieve truthful revelation. The ruler
then ﬁnds it optimal to choose a lower KH to reduce this rent loss. The qualitative idea
is common to the cases of the extractive ruler – satisfying (10) – and the generous ruler so
long as he does not unduly favor the bureaucrat – satisfying (9). But for a social-welfare-
maximizing ruler the bureaucrat’s rent is a transfer from the citizen and therefore costly only
16to the extent of any dead-weight loss, whereas for a bandit ruler the bureaucrat’s rent is a
direct reduction from his own take and therefore all of it is a cost. That is why a predatory
ruler is keener to avoid rent loss, and distorts the public good quantity downward by more,
than a generous ruler.
3 Full information
Let us begin by setting up an ideal standard where the buckets are leaky, but the ruler
knows the bureaucrat’s cost-type and can observe his actions. Thus the ruler can simply
instruct the bureaucrat of type i = L, H to implement a policy (Ki,F i,R i), subject only to
the participation constraints for each type of bureaucrat, which I write as UB(i) ≥ 0, and
the citizen’s participation constraint under each policy, which I write as SC(i) ≥ 0.
Here I merely state and interpret the results; the derivations are in the corresponding
section of the appendix.





1+γi (1 + λC)
for i = L, H , (11)
and sets the and R1E
i as high as possible, and F 1E
i as low as possible, consistently with
satisfying the citizen’s and the bureaucrat’s participation constraints with equality.
A generous ruler’s K1G
i is given by the same formula (11), but he sets R1G
i =0 ,a n d
F 1G
i as low as he can consistent with satisfying the participation constraint for each type
of bureaucrat. He gives as much beneﬁt to the citizen as he can, so keeps the citizen’s
participation constraint slack.
The expression for K1E
i is a simple modiﬁcation of the ideal K∗ in (1), to recognize
that the bureaucrat’s cost must be met by transfers from the citizen using the leaky bucket.
This is the stationary bandit in nearly the best of possible circumstances; his solution is as
eﬃcient as is feasible constrained only by the technology of monetary transfers.
3.1 Limited liability constraints
Even with full information, the transfers that are needed to implement the ruler’s optimum
may run into some limited liability constraints. In this section I discuss these. The analysis
17gets somewhat intricate and taxonomic, so in the later sections dealing with information
limitations I largely ignore the questions of limited liability. Those readers who wish to
focus on information issues can omit this section without signiﬁcant loss of continuity.
Eventhe most stringent of limitedliabilityconstraints, namelyone wherethe bureaucrat’s
cost is monetary and must be covered by his net ﬁnancial receipts, are automatically met in
the extractive case.
Next consider the case of a generous ruler. Here the ruler sets R1G
i = 0. He would like to
set F 1G
i suﬃciently low to meet the bureaucrat’s participation constraint with exact equality,
giving all beneﬁts to the citizen. Then the choice of K1G
i is the same as that for an extractive
ruler, given by (11), and is again eﬃcient constrained only by the leakiness of the transfer
bucket.
However the resulting Fi may violate some limited liabilityconstraints. There are various
cases.
Case 1: If the bureaucrat’s cost of supplying the public good is a monetary cost that must
be covered, then this constraint can never be met by the optimal Ki above, while keeping
the bureaucrat’s participation constraint binding. It turns out that the solution is still to
keep the optimal Ki unchanged, but to allow the bureaucrat fees large enough to cover costs.
This leaves the bureaucrat with positive utility and a slack participation constraint.
It turns out that the resulting utility for the bureaucrat is an increasing function of β,
the parameter that measures the intensity of his concern for the citizen. In other words,
a generous ruler in this case is more likely selectively to attract bureaucrats with greater
innate concern for citizens. Contrast this with the case of an extractive ruler, who drives
the utility of the bureaucrat to zero, regardless of the degree of the bureaucrat’s concern for
the citizen.
Case 2: If the bureaucrat’s monetary transfer receipts must merely be nonnegative, this
constraint binds when Ki is chosen at its constrained optimal level (11) if the bureaucrat’s
concern for the citizen exceeds a threshold:
β>
γi
1+2γi (1 + λC)
. (12)
18In that case, the ruler must solve a constrained optimization problem with Fi =0 . T h a t
yields a diﬀerent solution:
Ki =
ρC





This value is higher than that in (11). The intuition is as follows. The limited liability
constraint forces the ruler give more to the bureaucrat than he would like to. He tries to
oﬀset this by requiring the bureaucrat to provide more of the public good. The direct cost
of a small excess above the previous optimal is of the second order of smallness, while the
ruler’s valuation of the transfer of utility from the bureaucrat to the citizen is positive of the
ﬁrst order; therefore such a change is desirable to the ruler up to a point.
Case 3: The bureaucrat, who may in this case be a non-governmental organization,
especially a foreign one, has funds that the ruler can require it to transfer to the citizen.
Then one might think that a limitedliabilityconstraint would simply be irrelevant. However,
we cannot use the (1 + λC) factor; it would be unreasonable to suppose that the leakage
from the bucket reverses and the bucket gets fuller when it is traveling from the bureaucrat
to the citizen. It is more likely that there is some leakage in the opposite direction, too.
Therefore suppose that of each unit of money taken from the bureaucrat, only 1/(1 + μC)
reaches the citizen. Despite this, the transfer (holding all other things unchanged) would
raise the ruler’s utility if ρC/(1 + μC) >ρ B. Proceeding on this assumption, the generous





This is higher than the value (11) when limited liability constraints are irrelevant; it is even
higher than the ideal in (1). But it is not as high as the value (13) when transfers are
constrained to zero. Thus when the ruler has the ability to beneﬁt the citizen by direct
transfers, albeit costly ones, he ﬁnds it less necessary to distort the level of the public good
upward.
This solution conforms to its underlying assumption of transfers from the bureaucrat to





19If β lies between the two thresholds given by (12) and (15), then the ruler chooses to make no
monetary transfers in either direction in view of the leakiness of the buckets. The objective
function has a kink at the optimum of Fi = 0, and the value of Ki is given by (13).
To sum up, with complete information, the ruler would like to preserve eﬃciency in the
provision of public goods, and departs from this only because of leaky transfer buckets and
limited liability constraints. When the transfer is from the citizen to the bureaucrat, the
quantity of the public good is reduced. When a generous ruler wants to make the transfer
is from the bureaucrat to the citizen, and is either unable to do so, or must do so using a
leaky bucket, he chooses a higher level of the public good. In the case of zero transfers, a
generous ruler has to keep the bureaucrat above his outside opportunity, and a bureaucrat
who has greater innate concern for the citizen gets more rent.
I now turn to various situations of asymmetric information. In each of them, limited
liability constraints can create complications similar to those analyzed above. To avoid
much messy algebra and to focus on problems one at a time, I will mostly disregard limited
liability constraints from now on. However, I will retain the leaky buckets, so I can contrast
the results in my general cases with those in the conventional case of a benevolent ruler and
a selﬁsh bureaucrat.
4 Bureaucrat’s actions but not type observable
Now suppose the bureaucrat’s cost parameter γi, or equivalently his type i = L, H,i sh i s
private information, but the ruler can observe his choice Ki of the level of the public good
Ki,t h ef e eFi that he extracts from the citizen, and of course his remittance Ri to the ruler.
The ruler’s policy can then be formally characterized as a revelation mechanism,3 where he
asks the bureaucrat to report his type, and speciﬁes actions (Kj,F j,R j) contingent on the
reported type j. The ruler chooses this to maximize his objective, subject to the bureaucrat’s
3For any readers not familiarwith such direct or revelation mechanisms, I should emphasize that this need
not be the way in which the ruler’s policy is actually implemented. There may be various complex games
between the ruler and the bureaucrat, involving stages of communication, instructions, menus of contracts,
and incentives (carrots and/or sticks). But the the revelation principle says that the equilibrium outcome of
any such process can be characterized as if it arose from the direct mechanism here studied. See Myerson
(1982) for details and proofs of this general theory of mechanism design.
20incentive compatibility constraints which require truthful reporting to be optimal, and of
course all participation constraints.
Let the utility of a bureaucrat of true type i reporting type j be denoted by UB(i,j),
for i, j = L, H. Then the incentive compatibility constraints are UB(L,L) ≥ UB(L,H)a n d
UB(H,H) ≥ UB(H,L). The bureaucrat’s participation constraints become UB(L,L) ≥ 0
and UB(H,H) ≥ 0. Denoting the citizen’s utility when the bureaucrat is of type i (and
reporting this truthfully to the ruler) by SC(i), those participation constraints are Sc(L) ≥ 0,
SC(H) ≥ 0.
The ruler does not want to transfer from the citizen to the bureaucrat any more than
he has to. Therefore the participation constraint of type H, and the incentive constraint of
type L, are kept binding. The participation constraint of type L has to be slack, and with
all these, the incentive constraint of type H is automatically satisﬁed.
The ruler, attempting to reduce the rent 1
2 (γH − γL)(KH)2 that has to be given to the
type L bureaucrat, distorts downward the quantity KH of the public good to be supplied
by type H. This is also standard in such models. The new feature is that the extent of the





1+γH (1 + λC)+
θL
θH
(γH − γL)( 1+λC)[1− ρB(1 + λB)]
, (16)









ρC (1 + λC) − ρB
ρC − βρ B
. (17)
Both types of rulers require the L-type bureaucrat to supply the full-information levels of
the public good, so K2E
L and K2G
L are given by (11).
Let us now interpret and discuss these results.
[1] If the model is extended to allow more than two cost types, then only the least-cost
type will be asked to supply the eﬃcient level of the public good; that from all higher-cost
types will be distorted downward by successively more. Thus the problem is quite general,
and only gets compounded in more complex multi-type models.
21[2] In the conventional situation, which is a special instance of the generous case where







1+γH (1 + λC)+
θL
θH
λC (γH − γL)
. (18)
There is no distortion if in addition the bucket for transfers from the citizento the bureaucrat
does not leak (λC = 0). These results are familiar from Laﬀont and Tirole (1993) and Laﬀont
(2000). When the ruler’s objective is the total social surplus and transfers do not generate
any deadweight losses, giving rent to the bureaucrat is a pure transfer without direct cost to
the ruler, so there is no need to distort KH to reduce the rent. However, in the extractive
case, even with λC = 0, the ruler dislikes losing rent to the bureaucrat and therefore distorts
K2E
H downward. It remains true that the higher is λC, the greater the distortion.
[3] It is not possible to compare the distortions in the extractive and generous cases
simply by comparing the expressions (16) and (17), because the parameters ρC, ρB etc. in
the two must satisfy the diﬀerent inequalities that produce the one case or the other. We
can compare the distortion in the conventional case, shown above, to that in the case where





1+γH (1 + λC)+
θL
θH
(γH − γL)( 1+λC)
. (19)
Comparing (18) and (19), we see that since 1 + λC >λ C,w eh a v eK2E
H <K 2G
H ; the fully
predatory ruler distorts the quantity of the public good downward more than the full benev-
olent ruler does. Therefore we have reason to think that extremely predatory states will
show more failure (less provision of public goods) than very benevolent states.
A sample numerical calculation will illustrate the distinction, and also give us a better
feel for the magnitude of the problem. Take θL = θH = 1
2,a n dγH =1 ,γL =0 .5, so the
more eﬃcient type of bureaucrat has half the cost of the other type. Let λC =0 .25, the
oft-used ﬁgure for the average dead-weight loss per unit of revenue in income taxation even
in a relatively advanced tax systems like those in the United States. Contrast two regimes,
22a fully benevolent one with ρB = ρC = 1, and a totally predatory one with ρC = ρB =0 .
Suppose the bureaucrat is purely selﬁsh, so β =0 .
With these parameters, the optimal levels of the public good in various situations are
given in Table 1. We see that the need to oﬀer the bureaucrat an incentive-compatible
mechanism has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the level of the public good. The eﬀect is of a similar
magnitude to that arising from conventional dead-weight losses: the latter alone reduce KH
from 0.500 to 0.444, while the agency issue reduces it further to 0.421 in a benevolent state
and all the way to 0.348 in a predatory state. Thus we also see that agency has a substantially
bigger eﬀect in a predatory state than in a benevolent state.
Table 1: Comparisons of Optimal Public Good Provision
Situation KH KL
Ideal, ignoring leaky buckets: K∗
i 0.500 0.667
Leaky bucket but no agency problem K1G
i , K1E
i 0.444 0.615
Benevolent state; leaky bucket and agency K2G
i 0.421 0.615
Predatory state; leaky bucket and agency K2E
i 0.348 0.615
I have only considered the simplest kind of agency problem. In the concluding section I
mention other issues raised by the need to use bureaucrats as agents. These mostly operate
in the same direction, namely to worsen the provision of public goods, but it remains for
future research to examine whether those agency problems are also likely to be worse in
predatory states.
[4] For both types of rulers, the higher is ρB, the smaller is the denominator in the
expressions for KH, and therefore the smaller is the downward distortion in KH,t h a ti s ,
the higher is KH. This is obvious from (16) in the extractive case; the calculation for the
generous case is in the appendix. The intuition is as follows. If the ruler cares more about
the bureaucrat’s utility, then he is less concerned about leaving the bureaucrat with more
rent, and therefore has less need to distort the action to save on the rent-sharing. In this
sense the cause of eﬃciency in the provision of public goods is paradoxically helped if rulers
choose bureaucrats nepotistically! Of course an opposing argument is that θL may be lower
among this pool of bureaucrats, so on average the outcome may be worse.
23[5] In the generous case, the higher is β,t h el o w e ri sρC −βρ B.( B u ti tr e m a i n sp o s i t i v e
while β stays within the range given by (8): β<1/(1 + λC) implies
ρC − βρ B >ρ C − ρB/(1 + λC)=[ ρC (1 + λC) − ρB]/(1 + λC) > 0.)
So when β is higher, the denominator in (17) is higher, so KH is lower. A generous ruler
distorts the public good downward more when the bureaucrat has greater direct concern for
the citizen’s utility. This may seem strange, but has a good intuition. The utility of such
a bureaucrat increases by less, namely 1 − β(1 + λC), when a unit of money is transferred
to him from the citizen. But an L-type bureaucrat’s temptation to pretend to be H-type
is independent of β. Therefore to induce truthful revelation from a bureaucrat with more
direct concern for the citizen, the mechanism must promise him more money for reporting
type L. This increases the loss to the ruler’s utility; to save on this cost of rent-sharing, the
ruler must distort the action more.
[6] The bureaucrat’s utilityin this information situation is zero if he is H-type, and equals
the rent
1
2 (γH −γL)(KH)2 if he is L-type. In the extractive case K2E
H is independent of beta.
Therefore under an extractive ruler, potential bureaucrats fare equally well regardless of
their direct concern for the citizen’s utility. The extractive ruler similarly is indiﬀerent to
his bureaucrat’s degree of innate concern for the citizen. But in the generous case K2G
H
decreases as β increases. Therefore under a generous ruler, bureaucrats with a higher degree
of direct concern for the citizen’s utility get less surplus! This runs against the intuition
that a generous ruler would selectively attract the more concerned bureaucrats. However,
numerical calculations suggest that the magnitude of the eﬀect on the bureaucrat is small,
whereas the ruler and especially the citizen stand to gain much more from the presence
of a more benevolent bureaucrat. The reason is that even though under a more caring
bureaucrat the capital good quantity K2G
H must be distorted downward by more, the costly
transfers from the citizen to the bureaucrat are also smaller, and that eﬀect proves to be
bigger. Table 2 shows a calculation for the same parameters as used above, for the case of
a fully benevolent ruler, and varying degrees of the bureaucrat’s concern for the citizen’s
welfare. These calculations suggest that a benevolent ruler would like to attract a more
caring bureaucrat, and may be able to ﬁnd other ways (outside the model) to locate and
suitably compensate him.





L 0.615 0.615 0.615
K2G
H 0.421 0.412 0.390
Citizen’s utility
S2G
C (L) 0.252 0.408 1.040
S2G
C (H) 0.221 0.354 0.876
Bureaucrat’s utility
U2G
B (L) 0.044 0.042 0.038
Ruler’s expected utility
E[U2G
R ] 0.259 0.341 0.664
5 Type and choice of public good unobservable
In this section I consider an information condition where the ruler does not know the bu-
reaucrat’s cost type, and cannot observe the bureaucrat’s choice of the public good, but can
observe the ﬁnancial transactions at all levels. Now we must use a form of the revelation
principle where the agent’s type and some or all of his actions are unobservable (Myerson,
1982). The ruler’s direct mechanism asks the bureaucrat to report his type, and speciﬁes the
(Kj,F j,R j) as functions of the reported type, with the constraints that truthful reporting
must be optimal for the bureaucrat (the mechanism must be “honest” in Myerson’s terminol-
ogy) and implementing the unobservable action at the level stated by the ruler must also be
optimal for the bureaucrat ( the mechanism must be “obedient” in Myerson’s terminology).
Equivalently, we can think of the ruler choosing the transfers (Fj,R j), and anticipating that
for any given magnitudes of these transfers the bureaucrat is going to choose K to maxi-
mize his own payoﬀ, knowing his own type and subject only to the citizen’s participation
constraint.
Using (2), (3), and (4), we see that a bureaucrat whose true type is i a n dr e p o r t e dt y p e
is j will choose K to maximize
UB(i,j) ≡ Fj − (1 + λB)Rj −
1
2 γi K
2 + β [K −
1
2 K
2 − (1 + λC)Fj]
25subject to
SC = K −
1
2 K
2 − (1 + λC)Fj ≥ 0,
or







If the constraint (20) is not binding, the bureaucrat’s optimum choice is







So long as the bureaucrat’s concern for the citizen is limited by (8), we have 1/β > 1+λC,
and then   Ki <K 1E
i = K1G
i , the ruler’s optimal choices under full information constrained
only by the leakiness of the transfer buckets.
Figure 1: Citizen’s Participation Constraint and Bureaucrat’s Choice of K
Figure 1 shows the citizen’s participation constraint and the bureaucrat’s optimum ignor-
ing this constraint. If the ruler is happy to extract more from the citizen, then he can induce
the bureaucrat to supply a larger quantity of the public good than   Ki b yt h es i m p l ed e v i c e
of stipulating a fee larger than F(  Ki), which forces the bureaucrat to move to the right along
the citizen’s participation constraint. In fact, by choosing Fi as high as 1/[2(1 + λC)], the
ruler can achieve any level of K up to 1. An extractive ruler is happy to use this device to
some extent. In fact by this method such a ruler can achieve the same outcome as he could
in the previous section where K was observable. All he needs to do is to hire a bureaucrat
with a zero or minimal concern parameter β, and then set levels of fees Fi that will force
the desired K2E
L and K2E
H . That is obviously optimal for him. The details are again in the
appendix.
26Thus an extractive ruler can fully overcome the handicap of being unable to observe K
by hiring a very selﬁsh bureaucrat. As in the previous section, the bureaucrat’s payoﬀ from
this (zero for an H-type and positive for an L-type) is independent of β,s oa n yt y p eo f
bureaucrat is equally happy to work for such a ruler. Presumably it is not hard to ﬁnd
selﬁsh people; therefore we should expect predatory rulers to hire selﬁsh bureaucrats.
A generous ruler’s optimum is somewhat more complicated. He, too, can achieve the
quantity of the public good that would be optimal for him if it were directly observable.
But this now comes at the cost of forcing the citizen down to his participation constraint.
It is still possible that the increase in K toward greater eﬃciency increases the total social
surplus by so much that receiving some of it himself or giving it to the bureaucrat yields the
generous ruler a higher payoﬀ despite the leakages involved in these transfers. However, this
seems a strange way for the ruler’s generosity to manifest itself. Therefore I will exclude it
by considering the special case where the ruler has no concern for the bureaucrat’s surplus
at all (ρB = 0), and only a relatively minimal concern for his own take from the economy
(ρC >> 1). Then any outcome where the citizen gets zero welfare cannot be optimal.
The ruler must leave the citizen’s participation constraint slack, relying on the bureaucrat’s
unconstrained provision of the public good as given by (21).
In this case the ruler’s optimum again entails keeping the high-cost type bureaucrat
down at his participation constraint, and giving just enough rent to the low-cost type to
achieve truthful revelation. However, now the dependence of the payoﬀs on the bureaucrat’s
degree of concern β for the citizen is very diﬀerent. We have the remarkable result that
everyone’s payoﬀ is increasing in β. The ruler, the citizen, and even the low-cost bureaucrat
do better when the bureaucrat is more caring! This is a very strong ﬁnding of synergy
between benevolent rulers and caring bureaucrats.
I do not model the prior process by which bureaucrats get hired by rulers. One possibility
is that the ruler auctions the bureaucrat’s position; then a candidate with more concern for
the citizen is willing to bid more. This may be unrealistic, and other possibilities are worth
investigating. If the information condition being analyzed in this section is a reasonable
model of reality, weshould expect such a process to resultin the kind of matchingthat is often
observed in practice, namely, predatory rulers have uncaring bureaucrats (Rotberg, 2004,
27p. 7), whereas bureaucracies in benevolent states exhibit more concern for citizens, either
because of innate motivations or because of the sense of professionalism that is instilled in
them during their education and training, as for example captured in mottos like “Princeton
in the nation’s service.”
6 Type and fee unobservable
The information condition in this section is a counterpart of that in the previous section.
Here the ruler does not know the bureaucrat’s cost type, and cannot observe the fee the
bureaucrat extracts from the citizen, but can observe the quantity of the public good the
bureaucrat supplies, and the remittance he receives from the bureaucrat. So the ruler must
choose a direct mechanism specifying (Kj,R j), anticipating that for any given magnitudes
of these, the bureaucrat is going to choose F (appropriate to his privately known type)
to maximize his own payoﬀ, subject only to the citizen’s participation constraint. Here I
summarize the various cases and possibilities; the details are in the appendix.
So long as the bureaucrat’s concern for the citizen is limited by (8), he is going to extract
the maximum fee compatible with the citizen’s participation constraint, leaving the citizen
with zero surplus. The ruler should anticipate this in his choice of mechanism. If the ruler is
extractive, he would want the bureaucrat to extract this maximum fee anyway, and will then
extract the most he can from the bureaucrat consistent with the latter’s participation and
incentive compatibility constraints. This problem is formally identical with that of Section 4
where F was also observable, and the ruler is able to replicate that optimum in this case,
too.
A generous ruler, however, has a worse problem even than that of the previous section
where F was observable but K was not. There the ruler could beneﬁt the citizen to some
extent by setting the fee below what would extract all of the citizen’s surplus when the
bureaucrat was choosing K according to his own private objective. Now that is not possible.
The citizen is going to get zero surplus, and ruler’s choice of K and R has to be made
to maximize only that part of his objective that depends on his own and the bureaucrat’s
surpluses. I consider only one case that parallels a corresponding case one in the previous
section, namely, one where the ruler does not care for the bureaucrat’s surplus, so ρB =0 .
28Here it turns out that the generous ruler’s choice of the quantity of the public good is the
same as that of a totally predatory ruler in the case where all actions are observable, namely
(19). However, this appears to be a coincidence without any good intuitive reason.
The only better prospect for a generous ruler is to ﬁnd a bureaucrat with a suﬃciently
great concern for the citizen to reverse (8) making β (1 + λC) > 1. Such a bureaucrat is
more likely an aid organization that can bring funds to the table. Then the ruler can use
the bureaucrat’s generosity and achieve a high level of the public good. Such a bureaucrat
will set the fee as low as possible compatible with his own limit on liability. Various limited
liability constraints can be analyzed. The appendix analyzes the case Fi ≥ 0. Here a ruler
who cares only about the citizen’s welfare may be able to achieve a very high level of the
public good, namely K =1 .
7 Neither actions nor type observable
Now suppose the ruler does not know the bureaucrat’s type, and cannot observe either of the
bureaucrat’s actions: the public good provision K or the fee F extracted from the citizen.
The bureaucrat chooses these to maximize his own payoﬀ, constrained only by the citizen’s
participation constraint. The ruler can only stipulate the remittance R the bureaucrat must
deliver to him.
Now the bureaucrat’s optimum is a Coasian contract with the citizen. So long as β (1 +
λC) < 1, the bureaucrat wants to extract as much as he can from the citizen, and he does
not suﬀer from any informational limitation. Therefore it is optimal for him to provide the
same quantity of public good K1E
i given by (11) that would be optimal for the ruler in the
full information condition of section 3. However, he extracts all of the citizen’s surplus.
This suits an extractive ruler well, up to a point. He can in turn extract from the
bureaucrat. The amount extracted, say R, must be independent of the bureaucrat’s reported
type, RH = RL, for reasons of incentive-compatibility. Otherwise the bureaucrat would
report to be of that type j for which the Rj is smaller, while in the background taking
actions Ki, Fi appropriate for his true type. The ruler then sets the common value R as
high as is compatible with the participation constraints for both types of bureaucrats, and
29the constraint for the H-type binds ﬁrst. The appendix shows that this means giving rent
to the L-type of the amount
UB(L)=
1
2 (γH − γL)
1
1+γL (1 + λC)
1
1+γH (1 + λC)
. (22)
I said that the extractive ruler is helped only up to a point, because now he must give up
more rent than what would be needed if K and/or F were observable. The expression (22)
above can alternatively be written as
UB(L)=
1















the rent when the bureaucrat’s actions were observable (and also when only F or only K is
observable, because as we saw in the two previous sections, the extractive ruler can replicate
that solution with this limited observability).
Thus the unobservability of F removes the downward distortion in KH;b o t hKH and
KL are eﬃcient constrained only by the dead-weight losses. This moves the state away
from failure in the sense of the low provision of public goods. The bureaucrat is acting like
Olson’s stationary bandit. But it does not help the citizen; all of his surplus is extracted by
the bureaucrat by means of the ﬂat fee. And an extractive ruler is not helped by the increased
eﬃciency either, because he has to give away too much rent to the L-type bureaucrat.
The only kind of ruler who likes this situation is one who has suﬃciently high nepotistic
concern for the bureaucrat that he does not want to extract remittances: ρB (1 + λB) > 1.
Then the ruler is happy to leave the bureaucrat to exploit the citizen eﬃciently.
A benevolent ruler whose primary concern is for the citizen (ρB =0a n dρC >> 1)
of course dislikes this outcome where the bureaucrat gets all the beneﬁt. Again, such a
ruler’s only hope is to ﬁnd a bureaucrat whose degree of concern reverses (8). The appendix
analyzes the case where the bureaucrat sets his fee at zero, limited by the constraint on
liability Fi ≥ 0. In this case the bureaucrat’s choice of Ki is given by the same expression as
that for the unconstrained choice when F is observable, namely (21) in the previous section.
But now 1/β < 1+λC, therefore this   Ki now exceeds the level K1E
L = K1G
H of the full
information case. Once again, a higher β beneﬁts all parties.
Thus in this case of the most limited observability, therefore, we have the strongest
synergy between a benevolentruler and a caring bureaucrat, and it leads to a supra-optimally
high level of public good provision.
308 Suggestions for modiﬁcation and extension
My analysis was motivated by the question: Does the fact that policy must be administered
through a bureaucracy contribute to the failure of the state to provide public goods, and does
this correlate with the intentions of the top-level rulers? I suggested two ways in which this
could happen: predatory rulers may be more averse to giving incentive rents to bureaucrats,
and an assortative matching may emerge where predatory rulers employ selﬁsh bureaucrats
and benevolent rulers attract caring or professional bureaucrats. The model found some role
for both of these, but they operated diﬀerently in diﬀerent conditions. If the bureaucrat’s
actions are observable, then only the ﬁrst eﬀect operates: predatory rulers tolerate a greater
downward distortion in the provision of public goods to reduce rent-sharing, but under
predatory rulers, bureaucrats do equally well regardless of the extent of their selﬁshness or
caring for the citizen, and under benevolent rulers, caring bureaucrats actually do slightly
less well. When the ruler cannot observe the quantity of the public good the bureaucrat
provides, or vice versa, but can observe the fee he extracts from the citizen, a predatory
ruler can use this fee to replicate the optimum when the quantity of the public good is
observable. But in the same information conditions, a benevolent ruler must rely on a caring
bureaucrat to provide a higher quantity of the public good, and then a bureaucrat with a
higher degree of concern for the citizen brings higher payoﬀs to everyone: the ruler, the
citizen and also himself. These associations are further ampliﬁed if the ruler cannot even
observe the ﬁnancial transactions of the bureaucrat with the citizen, but here the bureaucrat
chooses the quantity of the public good eﬃciently in a Coasian arrangement with the citizen.
This variety of results suggests that understanding or prediction in any particular case
requires more context-speciﬁc conceptual and empirical analysis. It also suggests that my
simple model of agency needs to be expanded and enriched to bring in further eﬀects. Here
I mention some of these.
[1] The most important extension is to incorporate the possibility that a predatory ruler
underprovides public goods because that would make it more likely that the bureaucrats
(especially the military) and/or the citizens would rebel and overthrow him. In the linear-
quadratic framework of this model, a simple way to handle this is to change the right
31hand side of the bureaucrat’s participation constraint (6) to δB K and that of the citizen’s
participation constraint (7) to δC K for positive constants δB and δC. Consider the simplest
case, with no dead-weight losses of transfers, and full control over a purely selﬁsh agent. Then
a purely predatory ruler maximizes R subject to the bureaucrat’s participation constraint
F − R −
1
2 γK
2 ≥ δB K




2 − F ≥ δC K.
This means maximizing
(1 − δB − δC) K −
1
2 (1 + γ) K
2 .
If δB + δC < 1, the optimum is
K =
1 − δB − δC
1+γ
which is just (1−δB −δC) times the ideal in (1). If δB +δC ≥ 1, the predatory ruler provides
zero public goods. By contrast, a fully benevolent ruler who wants to maximize the total
surplus
[F − R − 1
2 γK
2 ]+[K − 1
2 K
2 − F ]=K − 1
2 (1 + γ) K
2 − R
will set R = 0, keep both participation constraints slack, and choose the ideal (1). Sim-
ilar diﬀerences will continue in all the subsequent cases of deadweight losses and various
information problems of agency.
[2] I distinguished the types of the bureaucrat by his cost of producing the public good
and his degree of concern for the citizen. However, only the former was private information
contributing to the agency problem; the latter was an exogenous parameter that was taken
to be common knowledge. I made some informal remarks suggesting how, from a pool of
potential employees with diﬀerent degrees of concern for the citizen, a ruler might hire a
bureaucrat who best suits his purpose, but did not incorporate this formally into the model.
Improvement in both these respects is an important task for further research.
[3] In reality there are many public goods, with diﬀerent degrees of substitution or com-
plementarity between them, and diﬀerent errors in observing the outcome of the bureaucrats’
32actions. This can create problems of bias, where the bureaucrat devotes more eﬀort to the
goods whose provision is more accurately observable by the ruler, and the ruler’s attempt to
cope with the problem of bias may force him to attenuate the strength of incentives he oﬀers
the bureaucrat for all goods (Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom, 1991). This eﬀect will exist regardless
of the ruler’s intention, and it remains to be seen whether it is stronger for a benevolent ruler
than for a predatory ruler. However, there are some obvious diﬀerences. With a benevolent
ruler, a bureaucrat with genuine direct concern for the citizen’s welfare will be less prone
to the bias, thereby easing the ruler’s multitask incentive problem, and perhaps further
augmenting the synergy between a benevolent ruler and a caring bureaucrat. A predatory
ruler may have speciﬁc preferences over multiple public goods; for example, Stalin’s and his
Soviet successors’ priorities were for investment, military, and big projects like the Moscow
Metro and space exploration, not for basic transport and utility infrastructure outside the
main cities. Then their agents in speciﬁc regions or industries are unlikely to share these
multidimensional preferences, thereby aggravating the multitask incentive problem.
[4] In reality there is a not just one bureaucrat but a whole bureaucracy. This creates
both problems and opportunities for the ruler. If there are several bureaucrats engaged
in doing similar things and subject to correlated shocks, then the ruler can use relative
performance schemes to improve the outcome according to his own objectives, whether they
be predatory or benevolent. However, if each bureaucrat is responsible for providing a
diﬀerent public good, or if diﬀerent bureaucrats are responsible for providing the public
good and for collecting taxes from the citizen, this creates new problems of moral hazard
in teams. Not only may one bureaucrat be unconcerned about making matters harder for
others, but each may not internalize the eﬀects of his actions on the other bureaucrat’s and
the citizen’s participation constraints. Then the ruler may have to give additional incentives
to ensure his own survival in power in the Nash (non-cooperative) equilibrium of such a
bureaucracy.
[5] I assumed that the bureaucrat’s outside option was exogenous (and set it equal to
zero). However, some types of intermediate-level functionaries have the possibility of seizing
power to become top rulers themselves. Such endogenization oﬀers interesting theoretical
possibilities with practical relevance.
33[6] I assumed the information structure to be exogenous (although I considered alterna-
tive possibilities). In reality, rulers go to considerable eﬀorts to improve their information.
However, they have to use other agents to obtain and communicate this information. There
is also a vertical hierarchy in the bureaucracy, where higher levels monitor the work of the
lower levels. Such layers and functions of bureaucracy raise issues of collusion and the need
for the ruler to devise his incentive schemes to reduce the incentives to collude (e.g. Laﬀont
and Tirole, 1993, chapter 12, Laﬀont, 2000, chapter 2).
[7] The top level ruler may actually be a coalition. If this coalition can conclude a bargain
in advance and present a united objective, the analysis with a single ruler stands. Otherwise
policymaking at the top level becomes a multi-principal (common agency) problem, and this
may cause a further and substantial deterioration in the power of incentives (Dixit, 1997).
It remains to be seen how this eﬀect operates diﬀerently when members of the coalition are
mostly predatory and when they are mostly benevolent but each is more concerned about
his own constituency of citizens. We also have the intriguing possibility that the weakness of
incentives caused by the common agency leads to deteriorating economic outcomes, which
further worsens the conﬂict among the multiple principals, leading to a downward spiral, or
a process by which state weakness turns into state failure and eventually into state collapse.
This long list of unsolved problems tells us that this paper should be seen as the mere
beginning of a potentially large and rich research agenda. But I hope it makes a modest and
useful start to the program.
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36Appendix: Mathematical derivations
The section numberings (A.sectionnumber) below correspond to those in the text for which
the algebraic detailsare supplied here. Equation numbersare inthe form (A.equationnumber)
consecutively throughout the appendix. When an equation is duplicated in the text (usually
under a diﬀerent number), this is stated.
A.3 Full information
Substituting the expressions for the surpluses in the text, (2) and (3), into the bureaucrat’s
utility function (4), the bureaucrat’s participation constraints for the two types become
UB(L) ≡ [1 − β(1 + λC)] FL − (1 + λB) RL + βK L − 1
2 (β + γL)( KL)
2 ≥ 0, (A.1)
UB(H) ≡ [1 − β(1 + λC)] FH − (1 + λB) RH + βK H −
1
2 (β + γH)( KH)
2 ≥ 0.(A.2)
The citizen’s participation constraints under the two types of policies are
SC(L) ≡ KL −
1
2 (KL)
2 − (1 + λC) FL ≥ 0, (A.3)
SC(H) ≡ KH −
1
2 (KH)
2 − (1 + λC) FH ≥ 0. (A.4)
Subject to these, the ruler wants to maximize his expected utility, the expression for
which is obtained by substituting the expressions for the surpluses (2) and (3) into the




[1 − ρB(1 + λB)] RL − [ρC(1 + λC) − ρB] FL + ρC KL −
1





[1 − ρB(1 + λB)] RH − [ρC(1 + λC) − ρB] FH + ρC KH − 1




It is best to solve this problem in stages. First hold the Ki, Ri ﬁxed and consider the
choices of the Fi. The condition of limited nepotism (9) ensures that Fi will be kept as low
as possible. Therefore the bureaucrat’s participation constraints will be binding:
Fi =
1+λB









1 − β(1 + λC)
Ki . (A.6)
37Next keep the Ki ﬁxed and consider the choice of Ri, bearing in mind the eﬀect on Fi as





[1 − ρB(1 + λB)] − [ρC(1 + λC) − ρB]
1+λB
1 − β(1 + λC)
 
= θi
1 − β (1 + λC) − (ρC − ρB β)(1+λB)(1+λC)
1 − β (1 + λC)
In the extractive case where (10) is fulﬁlled (and bearing in mind the assumption (8) limiting
the bureaucrat’s concern for the citizen), this is positive and Ri will be kept as high as possible
compatible with the citizen’s participation constraints. In the generous case, the Ri will be
kept as low as possible, namely zero. We have to consider the two cases separately.
Extractive case:
Now citizen’s as well as the bureaucrat’s participation constraints are binding. Therefore
















[1 − β(1 + λC)] Fi + βK i − 1














+ βK i − 1













Finally consider the choice of the Ki. Substituting the above expressions for Fi and Ri





1 − ρB(1 + λB)
(1 + λB)(1+λC)
{1 − [1 + γi (1 + λC)] Ki }
−
ρC(1 + λC) − ρB
1+λC





{1 − [1 + γi (1 + λC)] Ki }





1+γi (1 + λC)
. (A.7)
38This is reproduced as (11) and discussed in the text.
We also have



























Thus even the most stringent of the limited liability constraints I have considered, namely
the one where the bureaucrat’s cost of providing the public good is monetary and must be
covered by the net transfers he receives, is met (albeit only just). Thus limited liability
constraints are not an issue in the extractive case.
Generous case:
Here Ri =0 ,a n dt h eFi is found using (A.1) and (A.2):
Fi =
1
1 − β(1 + λC)
[
1
2 (β + γi)( Ki)
2 − βK i ].





ρC (1 + λC) − ρB
1 − β(1 + λC)
[ β − (β + γi) Ki]+ρC − (ρC + γi ρB) Ki
 
=
ρC − ρB β
1 − β(1 + λC)
{1 − [1 + γi (1 + λC)] Ki }
Now
ρC − ρB β>ρ C − ρB /(1 + λC)u s i n g ( 8 )
=[ ρC (1 + λC) − ρB]/(1 + λC) > 0. by(9)
Therefore the optimum Ki is found by setting ∂EU(R)/∂Ki = 0. This yields the same
expression for K1G
i as for K1E
i in the extractive case.
A.3.1 Limited Liability constraints
However, this choice may violate lower bounds on Fi.A sd i s c u s s e di nt h et e x t ,t h e r ec a nb e
diﬀerent kinds of “limited liability constraints.” As I also said in the text, readers who wish
to focus on information issues can omit this section without signiﬁcant loss of continuity.
39Let us consider the various possibilities.
Case 1: The bureaucrat’s monetary cost must be covered: We are in the generous case,
so the Ri are already pushed down to zero. Therefore the bureaucrat’s cost must be covered
by charging fees to the consumer: Fi ≥
1
2 γi (Ki)2 . Using the above expression for Fi,t h i s
requires
1
2 (β + γi)( Ki)






2 β [1+γi (1 + λC)]( Ki)
2 ≥ βK i ,
or
1
2 [1+γi (1 + λC)]Ki ≥ 1.
Using the value of Ki from (A.7), this becomes
1
2 ≥ 1, which is impossible. Therefore in
this case the constraint on covering the bureaucrat’s monetary cost can never be satisﬁed
automatically. The ruler is forced to allow the bureaucrat to charge a suﬃciently high fee
to cover the cost. This makes the bureaucrat’s participation constraint slack.
The ruler must choose the optimal Ki bearing all this in mind. With Ri =0a n d
Fi = 1













2 (ρC + γi ρB)( Ki)
2
 
= θi {− [ρC(1 + λC) − ρB] γi Ki + ρC − (ρC + γi ρB) Ki }
= θi ρC { 1 − [1 + γi(1 + λC)] } Ki
Setting this equal to zero yields the same solution for Ki a sb e f o r e . T h u se ﬃ c i e n c yi sn o t
aﬀected, but the distribution of utilities is. The bureaucrat’s participation constraint is slack
and he gets some rent. Speciﬁcally, for the type-i bureaucrat,
UB(i)=[ 1− β(1+ λC)]
1
2 γi (Ki)
2 + βK i −
1
2 (β + γi)( Ki)
2 .
The expression for Ki does not involve β explicitly; therefore
∂UB(i)
∂β
= −(1 + λC)] 1
2 γi (Ki)













40using the optimal value of Ki. Thus the greater the bureaucrat’s concern for the citizen, the
more utility he gets.
Case 2: The bureaucrat must receive non-negative monetary transfers: With the Ri
already pushed down to zero, this requires Fi ≥ 0. The constraint is automatically fulﬁlled
by the Ki given by (A.7) that was optimal in the absence of such a constraint, if
1
2 (β + γi)( Ki)
2 ≥ βK i ,
or
1




1+2γi (1 + λC)
.
If this inequality is violated, then the ruler must set Fi =0 .T h a tm a k e s
∂EU(R)
∂Ki




ρC + γi ρB
. (A.8)
This is duplicated as equation (13) in the text. The level of Ki here is higher than the
optimum value of Ki in (A.7) when the nonnegativity constraint on Fi is not binding:
ρC
ρC + γi ρB
>
1
1+γi (1 + λC)
corresponds to
ρC [1+γi (1 + λC)]>ρ C + γi ρB ,
or ρC (1 + λC) >ρ B, which is true by assumption.
The bureaucrat’s participation constraint is slack. With Ri = Fi =0 ,t y p e - i bureaucrat’s




2 (β + γi)( Ki)
2 ,
41where Ki is deﬁned by (A.8); it is < 1 and is independent of β. Therefore
∂UB(i)
∂β
= Ki − 1
2 (Ki)
2 = Ki (1 − 1
2 Ki) > 0.
So in this case, too, a bureaucrat who has greater concern for the citizen’s welfare gets higher
utility.
Case 3: The bureaucrat can be milked for transfers, but using another leaky bucket: Here
Fi can be negative. However, the citizen receivedonly 1/(1+μC) for each unit the bureaucrat
gives up. The ruler wants to utilize this way of transferring money from the bureaucrat to
the citizen if ρC/(1+μC) >ρ B. Let us proceed on this assumption; otherwise the ruler keeps
Fi = 0 and we are back in Case 2.
Now the ruler can use this avenue of transfer to drive the bureaucrat back to his partic-
ipation constraint. Once again Ri = 0 since the ruler is generous, and now the Fi is found
using
UB(i)=[ 1− β/(1 + μC)] FL + βK L −
1





1 − β/(1 + μC)
[ 1
2 (β + γi)( Ki)
2 − βK i ].
The ruler’s objective function (A.5) must be changed to recognize the diﬀerence in the
leakage. To save algebra I will simply write the part corresponding to the case when the
bureaucrat is of type i,s a yUR(i), and recognizing Ri =0 :
UR(i)=−[ρC/(1 + μC) − ρB] FL + ρC KL −
1






ρC/(1 + μC) − ρB
1 − β/(1 + μC)
[( β + γi) Ki − β]+ρC − (ρC + γi ρB) Ki
=
1









βρC + γi ρC
1+μC







ρC − βρ B
1 − β/(1 + μC)
{ 1 − [1 + γi/(1 + μC)] Ki }
42We are assuming ρC/(1 + μC) >ρ B. Also, (8) is a maintained assumption throughout
the paper; therefore 1 >β(1 + λC) >β / (1 + μC). Therefore
ρC/(1 + μC) >ρ B β/(1 + μC), or ρC >βρ B , so ρC − βρ B > 0.





This is reproduced in the text as (14). The level of the public good in this case is clearly
higher than the optimal Ki given by (A.7) when Fi > 0. It even exceeds the ideal ﬁrst best
given by the text equation (1) in the absence of leaky buckets, namely Ki =1 /(1+γi). But
it is not as high as the level given by (A.8) when Fi is constrained to equal zero:
ρC





ρC + ρC γi/(1 + μC) >ρ C + γi ρB that is, ρC/(1 + μC) >ρ B ,
which is the premise of this case. Thus, when the ruler has a preferred way of transferring
money from the bureaucrat to the citizen, there is less need to distort the level of the public
good upward.
It remains to verify whether, or when, this solution actually yields negative Fi.U s i n g
the starting formula in this case for Fi, we see that we need 1
2 (β + γi)( Ki)2 <βK i,o r
1





Finally, suppose we are in the generous case, but the ruler is nepotistic toward the
bureaucrat: (9) is violated; ρB >ρ C (1 + λC); and the ruler wants to transfer money from
the citizen to the bureaucrat even though the bucket leaks. Now the ruler will set Ri =0 ,
but leave the citizen on his participation constraint, so Fi =[ Ki −
1













43and the ruler’s expected utility is simply his valuation of the bureaucrat’s surplus:







− γi Ki ,







1+γi (1 + λC)
> 0.
Therefore Fi > 1
2 γi(Ki)2, that is, any requirement to cover the bureaucrat’s monetary cost
is automatically satisﬁed, so no issues of limited liability constraints arise. The bureaucrat’s
participation constraint is slack, but here the ruler wants it to be.
A.4 Bureaucrat’s actions but not type observable
For ease of repeated reference, I will call the incentive compatibility constraints of the two
types L, H of bureaucrats BICL and BICH respectively, and their participation constraints
BPCL, BPCH respectively. The participation constraints for the citizen when the bureau-
crat is of type L or H will be referred to as CPCL, CPCH respectively.
Recall that the utility of a bureaucrat whose true type is i a n dr e p o r t e dt y p ei sj is
written UB(i,j). The UB(i,i) were previously written simply as UB(i). Substituting the
expressions for the surpluses in the text, (2) and (3), into the bureaucrat’s utility function
(4), we can write BICL as
UB(L,L) ≡ [1 − β(1 + λC)] FL − (1 + λB) RL + βK L −
1
2 (β + γL)(KL)
2
≥ UB(L,H) ≡ [1 − β(1 + λC)] FH − (1 + λB) RH + βK H −
1
2 (β + γL)( KH)
2 . (A.10)
A more compact form of this is
UB(L,L) ≥ UB(H,H)+
1
2 (γH − γL)( KH)
2 . (A.11)
Similarly, BICH is
UB(H,H) ≡ [1 − β(1 + λC)] FH − (1 + λB) RH + βK H −
1
2 (β + γH)(KH)
2
≥ UB(H,L) ≡ [1 − β(1 + λC)] FL − (1 + λB) RL + βK L −
1
2 (β + γH)( KL)
2 , (A.12)
44or more compactly,
UB(H,H) ≥ UB(L,L) −
1
2 (γH − γL)( KL)
2 . (A.13)
The participation constraints remain BPCL:( A . 1 ) ,BPCH:(A.2) for the bureaucrat, and
CPCL:( A . 3 ) ,CPCH: (A.4) for the citizen when the bureaucrat is of the respective types
L, H. The expression for the ruler’s expected utility also remains (A.5).
A familiar argument simpliﬁes the constrained maximization problem. I present it in a
sequence of short lemmata.
Lemma 1: BICL and BPCH together imply BPCL, with slack if KH > 0.
The proof is immediate from (A.11) and (A.2).
Lemma 2: If BICL is binding and KL ≥ KH,t h e nBICH is satisﬁed, with slack if
KL >K H.
Proof: Using (A.11) with exact equality, substitute for UB(L,L) on the right hand side
of (A.13). This yields
UB(H,H) ≥ UB(H,H) − 1
2 (γH − γL)[( KL)
2 − (KH)
2 ].
This is true if KL ≥ KH, and the inequality is strict if KL >K H.
Lemma 3: If the condition (9) is satisﬁed, then BICL is binding at the optimum.
Proof: Suppose not. Then (A.11) is a strict inequality, and BPCH ensures UB(H,H) ≥ 0;
therefore from (A.11) we have UB(L,L) > 0, that is, BPCL must be slack as well. Consider
the eﬀect of lowering FL slightly, leaving FH and the Ri, Ki unchanged. This lowers UB(L,L)
slightly, but has no eﬀect on UB(H,H); therefore from (A.11) which is slack by the current
assumption, we see that both BICL and BPCL go on being satisﬁed. The fulﬁllment of
BICH and CPCL is actually helped by the reduction in FL, while BPCH and CPCH are
unaﬀected. And (9) ensures that EU(R) increases. Therefore the previous situation with a
slack BICL cannot have been optimum.
Therefore I solve a “relaxed” problem with fewer constraints pertaining to the bureaucrat,
namely BICL and BPCH holding as equations, and verifythat in the solution KL >K H > 0.
Then the other two constraints BICH and BPCL will be satisﬁed, in fact with slack, so the
solution will also solve the full problem.
45With BPCH binding, UB(H,H)=0a n dBICL in its alternative form (A.11) is simply
UB(L,L) ≥
1
2 (γH − γL)( KH)2. Taking this to bind, and using the expression for UB(L)i n
(A.1), the constraint becomes





2 (γH −γL)( KH)
2 =0. (A.14)
The other constraint BPCH is the same (A.2) as before, restated here for convenience:
[1 − β(1 + λC)] FH − (1 + λB) RH + βK H −
1
2 (β + γH)( KH)
2 =0. (A.15)
The argument now proceeds in the same steps as in the full information case.
Extractive case:











for i = L, H . (A.16)
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[1 − β(1+ λC)] FL + βK L − 1
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2 (β + γL)( KL)
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1 − ρB(1 + λB)
(1 + λB)(1+λC)
{1 − [1 + γL (1 + λC)] KL }
−
ρC(1 + λC) − ρB
1+λC





{1 − [1 + γL (1 + λC)] KL }.
Setting this equal to zero yields the same optimum choice of K2E
L as in the full information





1 − ρB(1 + λB)
(1 + λB)(1+λC)
{1 − [1 + γH (1 + λC)] KH }
−
ρC(1 + λC) − ρB
1+λC
(1 − KH)+ρC − (ρC + γH ρB) KH
 
























1+γH (1 + λC)+
θL
θH
(γH − γL)( 1+λC)[1− ρB(1 + λB)]
, (A.19)
This is reproduced in the text as (16). Inspection of the equations veriﬁes K2E
L >K 2E
H > 0,
as is required for the “relaxed” problem to yield a solution to the full problem.
With this solution, the citizen is kept on his participation constraint and gets zero surplus
under either type of bureaucrat: SC(L)=SC(H)=0 . T h eH-type bureaucrat also gets
UB(H) = 0, whereas the L-type gets rent UB(L)=SB(L)=
1




R = θL [RL + ρB SB(L)]+θHR H ,
where the formulae for RL and RH are given above. All these magnitudes are independent
of β. Therefore the ruler does not care whether he employs a bureaucrat with more or
47less innate concern for the citizen, nor does the bureaucrat’s utility from working for an
extractive ruler depend on his (the bureaucrat’s) innate degree of concern for the citizen.
Generous case:
Here the ruler sets Ri = 0, and does not want to drive the citizen down to a binding
participation constraint. Therefore FH is found using (A.15):
FH =
1
1 − β(1 + λC)
 
1
2 (β + γH)( KH)
2 − βK H
 
,
and is the same as the expression as in the full information case. But from (A.14), we have
FL =
1
1 − β(1+ λC)
 
1
2 (β + γL)( KL)
2 − βK L + 1









ρC(1 + λC) − ρB
1 − β(1 + λC)
[ β − (β + γL) KL]+ρC − (ρC + γL ρB) KL
 
=
ρC − ρB β
1 − β(1 + λC)
{1 − [1 + γL (1 + λC)] KL },
yielding the same solution (A.7) for K2G





ρC(1 + λC) − ρB
1 − β(1+ λC)
[ β − (β + γH) KH]+ρC − (ρC + γH ρB) KH
 
− θL
ρC(1 + λC) − ρB
1 − β(1 + λC)
(γH − γL) KH
= θH
ρC − ρB β
1 − β(1 + λC)
{1 − [1 + γH (1 + λC)] KH }
− θL
ρC(1 + λC) − ρB
1 − β(1 + λC)
(γH − γL) KH









ρC (1 + λC) − ρB
ρC − βρ B
. (A.20)
This is reproduced as (17) in the text. The requirement K2G
L >K 2G
H > 0 is easily veriﬁed.
The last fraction in the denominator of (A.20) can be written as [δ(1+λC)−1]/(δ −β),
where δ = ρC/ρB. It is easy to see that it is increasing in λC and in β. Therefore the
48distortion in K2G
H is larger when the bucket is more leaky, and somewhat surprisingly, when
the bureaucrat has greater concern for the citizen. This is discussed in the text. As for the









(δ − β)2 { (1 + λC)(δ − β) − [δ(1 + λC) − 1] }
=
1 − β(1 + λC)
(δ − β)2 > 0.
Therefore the distortion is greater when the ruler is more concerned about the citizen (higher
ρC) or less concerned about the bureaucrat (lower ρB). This is also surprising at ﬁrst sight,
a n di sd i s c u s s e di nt h et e x t .
Since K2G
H decreases as β decreases, so does the L-type bureaucrat’s payoﬀ,
UB(L,L)=1




However, the citizen does get positive surplus under both types of bureaucrats. The expres-
sions are complicated and it is not possible to determine uniquely how they behave as β
changes. Therefore I leave this to numerical calculations, illustrated in the text.
A.5 Type and choice of public good unobservable
In this section the ruler does not know the bureaucrat’s type i = L, H, and does not observe
the action K, but can observe F, R. Therefore the ruler’s direct or revelation mechanism
must be both “honest” and “obedient” as in Myerson (1982); it asks the bureaucrat to
report his type, and commits to policies Fj, Rj as a function of the reported type. The
ruler chooses these to maximize his expected payoﬀ, subject to all participation constraints,
and the incentive constraints that induce the bureaucrat to report the type optimally, while
choosing K privately to optimize his (bureaucrat’s) own payoﬀ.
As stated in the text, a bureaucrat whose true type is i a n dr e p o r t e dt y p ei sj will choose
K to maximize
UB(i,j) ≡ Fj − (1 + λB)Rj −
1
2 γi K
2 + β [K −
1
2 K
2 − (1 + λC)Fj]
subject to
SC = K −
1
2 K
2 − (1 + λC)Fj ≥ 0,
49or







The solution was described in the text in conjunction with Figure 1; here is a more formal
statement. Deﬁne












  Ki if Fj ≤ F(  Ki)
F −1(Fj)i f F(  Ki) <F j ≤ 1/[2(1 + λC)]
(A.23)
So long as the bureaucrat’s concern for the citizen is limited by (8), we have 1/β > 1+λC,
and then








the ruler’s optimal choices under full information constrained only by the leakiness of the
transfer buckets. So these higher levels of K can be achieved only by setting the fee at a
level where the citizen’s participation constraint will bind.
Extractive case:
As explained in the text, I am assuming that β is small enough to ensure
  KH <K
2E
H .
More precisely, using (A.22) and (A.19), the condition is
1+γH/β > 1+γH (1 + λC)+
θL
θH




γH (1 + λC)+
θL
θH










(1 + λC)[1− ρB(1 + λB)]
,
50so we see that it is a stronger restriction on β than the previously maintained (8), namely
β<1/(1 + λC). We already know that





Therefore attempting to induce either type of bureaucrat to supply the quantity of the
public good closer to the ruler’s optimum under the condition of observability of K requires
the ruler to use higher fees and keep the citizen’s participation conditions binding. I now
show that the ruler’s optimum with these constraints imposed actually coincides with the
ruler’s optimum when K was observable. As the ruler is able to replicate a better optimum,
this must also be optimal with K unobservable.
With K unobservable, the ruler’s revelation mechanism can only stipulate (Fj,R j)a s
functions of the bureaucrat’s reported type j. As shown in the text, in the region F(  Kj) ≤
Fj ≤ 1/[2(1 +λC)] there is a monotonic increasing relationship between Fj and the bureau-
crat’s chosen level of K in the range   Kj ≤ K ≤ 1. Therefore we can formally equivalently
deﬁne the ruler’s mechanism by (Kj,R j) even though K is not observable.















When the citizen gets no surplus, the bureaucrat’s utility equals his own surplus regardless
of his concern parameter β,s o























2 [1 + γi (1 + λC)] (Kj)
2
 
− (1 + λB) Rj







2 [1 + γL (1 + λC)] (KL)
2
 







2 [1 + γL (1 + λC)] (KH)
2
 
− (1 + λB) RH ,(A.25)






2 [1 + γH (1 + λC)] (KH)
2
 






2 [1 + γH (1 + λC)] (KL)
2
 
− (1 + λB) RL . (A.26)
More compact forms of these are exactly the same as in the case where K was observable,
namely equations (A.11) and (A.13). The participation constraints BPCi are UB(i,i) ≥ 0
for i = L, H.
Then exactlythe same three lemmasas inthe case of section A.4, where K was observable,
tell us that the solution will have BICL and BPCH binding, and BICH and BPCL slack,
so long as the solution to such a relaxed problem has KL >K H > 0. So I proceed on this
assumption and verify it at the end.






2 [1 + γH (1 + λC)] (KH)
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2 [1 + γL (1 + λC)] (KL)
2
 
− (1 + λB) RL =
1

















(γH − γL)( KH)
2 .
(A.28)
Equations (A.24), (A.27), and (A.28) are the same as the corresponding equations (A.16),
(A.17), and (A.18) for the case when K is observable. Therefore the expression for the ruler’s
expected utility in terms of KL and KH is also identical, and the same optimum is obtained.
In the process the assumption underlying the relaxed problem, namely KL >K H > 0, is
veriﬁed.
52Generous case:
As explained in the text, I analyze only an extreme case where ρB =0a n dρC >> 1. So
keepingthe citizen’sparticipation constraints binding is not going to be optimal. Accordingly
I proceed on the basis that those constraints are slack, and the bureaucrat is going to choose
Ki =   Ki.
Then a bureaucrat of type i reporting type j has payoﬀ
UB(i,j)=Fj − (1 + λB)Rj −
1
2 γi (  Ki)
2 + β [   Ki −
1
2 (  Ki)
2 − (1 + λC)Fj]














The incentive constraints become: BICL



















T h e s ec o l l a p s et o
[1 − β(1 + λC)] FL − (1 + λB) RL =[ 1− β(1 + λC)] FH − (1 + λB) RH ≡ Z, (A.29)
where the symbol Z is introduced to simplify some subsequent expressions.
The bureaucrat’s participation constraints can then be written as
























or BICH implies BICL.I f BICH is binding (as it will be at the optimum), then BICL is












2 γH − γL







The citizen’s participation constraints under the two types of bureaucrats are, for i = L,
H:
SC(i)=  Ki − 1
2 (  Ki)















































The ruler’s objective function (under the current assumption ρB =0 )i s
EU(R)=θL
 
RL − ρC (1 + λC) FL + ρC [   KL − 1





RH − ρC (1 + λC) FH + ρC [   KH − 1
2 (  KH)
2)]
 
This is to be maximized by choosing the Ri and Fi, subject to (A.29), and the participation




[1 − β(1 + λC)]FL − Z
1+λB
− ρC (1 + λC) FL + ρC [   KL − 1





[1 − β(1+ λC)] FH − Z
1+λB
− ρC (1 + λC) FH + ρC [   KH −
1





1 − β(1+ λC) − ρC (1 + λB)(1 + λC)
1+λB
FL + ρC [   KL −
1





1 − β(1 + λC) − ρC (1 + λB)(1 + λC)
1+λB
FH + ρC [   KH −
1






Under the current assumption ρC >> 1, all of FL, FH and Z should be made as small as
possible. I will consider only the case where the Fi must be non-negative, leaving other kinds
of limited liability constraints for the interested readers. So the optimum has FL = FH =0 ,
and Z given by a binding participation constraint for the H-type bureaucrat, (A.30). The
resulting payoﬀ for the ruler is
EU(R)=θL ρC [   KL −
1
2 (  KL)
2)]+θH ρC [   KH −
1







Now consider the dependence of the resulting payoﬀs on β, the parameter of the bureau-
crat’s concern for the citizen. From (A.34) the ruler’s payoﬀ satisﬁes
∂EU(R)/∂  Ki = ρC [1−   Ki ] > 0 because   Ki < 1,






so the numerator increases and the denominator decreases as β increases.
In money terms, the ruler gets
Ri =







from both types of bureaucrat. This is not really what the generous ruler would like; he
would rather leave the money with the citizen. But since that would require negative Fi
55which is infeasible by assumption, he prefers to get the money himself than leave it with the
bureaucrat.
The H-type bureaucrat gets zero regardless of β;t h eL-type’s payoﬀ given by (A.31)
is an increasing function of β. And from (A.33), the citizen’s payoﬀ is also an increasing
function of β.
So in this case a bureaucrat with a greater degree of concern for the citizen yields a
Pareto-better outcome – better for the citizen, the ruler, and himself if L-type.
A.6 Type and fee unobservable
In this section the ruler does not know the bureaucrat’s type i = L, H, and does not observe
the fee F, but can observe K, R. Therefore the ruler’s direct or revelation mechanism
commits to policies Kj, Rj as a function of the reported type, to maximize his expected
payoﬀ, subject to all participation constraints, and the incentive constraints that induce
the bureaucrat to report the type optimally, while choosing F privately to optimize his
(bureaucrat’s) own payoﬀ.
A bureaucrat of actual type i who reports type j and chooses fee F gets payoﬀ






2 − (1 + λC) F
 
.
So long as the bureaucrat’s concern for the citizen is limited by (8), he will want F to be as




2 − (1 + λC) F ≥ 0.
















2 [1+γi (1 + λC)](Kj)
2
 
− (1 + λB) Rj .






2 [1+γL (1 + λC)](KL)
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2 [1+γL (1 + λC)](KH)
2
 
− (1 + λB) RH ,






2 [1+γH (1 + λC)](KH)
2
 






2 [1+γH (1 + λC)](KL)
2
 
− (1 + λB) RL .
These can be written more compactly as
UB(L,L) ≥ UB(L,H)+1
2 (γH − γL)( KH)
2
UB(H,H) ≥ UB(H,L) −
1
2 (γH − γL)( KL)
2 .
The participation constraints BPCL and BPCH are as usual
UB(L,L) ≥ 0,U B(H,H) ≥ 0
respectively.
Extractive case:
The incentive constraints above have the same form as (A.11) and (A.13) in Section A.4.
Therefore the lemmas proved there are valid here, and we can consider a relaxed problem

























2 (γH − γL)( KH)
2 .
These are the same as (A.17) and (A.18) respectively in Section A.4. Therefore the solution
there goes through; even though only K is observable, the ruler is able to replicate the same
outcome as in the case where both K and F are observable.
57Generous case:
As in the previous section, I consider only the case where the ruler does not care directly
about the bureaucrat’s welfare: ρB = 0. However, now the ruler must accept the fact that
the bureaucrat with his limited concern for the citizen is going to leave the latter with zero
surplus. Then the ruler’s objective reduces to
EU(R)=θH RH + θL RL .
Using the above expressions for RH and RL implied by the incentive and participation
constraints and maximizing with respect to KH and KL yields
KL =
1





1+γH (1 + λC)+
θL
θH
(1 + λC)(γH − γL)
.
This is the same as the expression (19) for K2E
H , the choice of a totally predatory ruler
employinga fully selﬁsh bureaucrat, when both actions are observable. However, this appears
to be a coincidence without any deep intuitive signiﬁcance.
Now suppose the ruler is able to obtain a bureaucrat with suﬃciently high concern
reversing (8), so β (1 + λC) > 1. Such a bureaucrat extracts the lowest fee from the citizen
compatible with the bureaucrat’s own liability limit. To avoid proliferation of cases, consider
only the case where this implies F = 0, and suppose the ruler cares only about the citizen,








The ruler can maximize this by setting KH = KL = 1; this exceeds the total-surplus-
maximizing level because now the ruler’s objective does not directly include the bureaucrat’s
cost 1
2 γK 2. The ruler can then choose the remittance amounts RL and RH to satisfy
the incentive and participation constraints BICL and BPCH. It is easy to verify that for
KH = KL = 1 they yield




58Even though β>1/(1 + λC), we may have β<γ H,s oRH = RL may be negative, and
the ruler may have to make some transfers to the bureaucrat. If that is infeasible, then the
ruler’s choices of K will have to be modiﬁed accordingly. I omit the details because the case
is already somewhat arcane and the results are uninformative.
A.7 Neither actions nor type observable
In this section the ruler does not know the bureaucrat’s type i = L, H, and does not
observe either of the action K, F; he can only observe his own receipt R. Therefore the
ruler’s direct or revelation mechanism asks the bureaucrat to report his type, and commits
to the Rj the ruler will ask the bureaucrat to deliver, as a function of the reported type,
to maximize his (ruler’s) expected payoﬀ, subject to all participation constraints, and the
incentive constraints that induce the bureaucrat to report the type optimally, while choosing
K and F privately to optimize his (bureaucrat’s) own payoﬀ for his true type i. That means
maximizing
UB(i,j)=Fi − (1 + λB) Rj −
1
2 γi (Ki)
2 + β [Ki −
1
2 (Ki)
2 − (1 + λC)Fi ], (A.35)




2 − (1 + λC)Fi . (A.36)
So long as the bureaucrat’s concern for the citizen is limited by (8), we see from (A.35)




















− (1 + λB) Rj −
1
2 γi (Ki)







2 [1 + γi (1 + λC)] (Ki)
2
 
− (1 + λB) Rj
Choosing Ki to maximize this yields
Ki =
1
1+γi (1 + λC)
,
59the same solution (A.7) as in the full-information case, K1E
i = K1G
i . In other words, the
bureaucrat makes a Coasian contract with the citizen, eﬃcient constrained only by the dead-
weight losses in the transfer from the citizen to the bureaucrat, and then extracts all of the










2 [1 + γi (1 + λC)]
 
1











1+γi (1 + λC)
− (1 + λB) Rj . (A.37)
The ruler, whether extractive or generous, must operate within this constraint of the
bureaucrat’s choice. The only thing that changes when the bureaucrat changes his reported
type is the transfer the ruler will require from him. Therefore the incentive compatibility
conditions reduce to
BPCL : − (1 + λB) RL ≥−(1 + λB) RH ,
BPCH : − (1 + λB) RH ≥−(1 + λB) RL .
In each case, all the other lengthy terms involvingthe true type’s choices(Ki,F i) are common
to the two sides and therefore cancel. This leaves simply RH = RL; call the common value
R.
The ruler’s objective then becomes
EU(R)=[1− ρB (1 + λB)]R + terms independent of R.
Two cases arise.
[1] If ρB (1 + λB) < 1, the ruler sets R at the maximum possible level, namely the one








1+γH (1 + λC)
. (A.38)
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[1 + γL (1 + λC)] [1 + γH (1 + λC)]
 
= 1
2 (γH − γL)
1
1+γL (1 + λC)
1
1+γH (1 + λC)
(A.39)
Although the H-type bureaucrat sets the levels of the public good without any downward
distortion that the ruler found necessary when K was observable, and the ruler can hold this
bureaucrat down to his participation constraint, the unobservability of K and F hurts the



















the rent given away at the ruler’s optimum when the bureaucrat’s actions but not type were
observable.
[2] If ρB (1 + λB) > 1, then the ruler keeps Ri = 0 and lets both types of bureaucrats
keep the fees they have extracted from the citizens. The participation constraint for both
types of bureaucrats is slack.
Observe that this distinction between cases is diﬀerent from the extractive-generous dis-
tinction governed by (10) that mattered in all the previous sections. That is because the
ruler now knows that the bureaucrat is not going to leave the citizen with any surplus, and
then the only question is whether the ruler wants to extract money from the bureaucrat even
though this entails the dead-weight loss λB.
A highly predatory ruler with low or zero ρB (or one who has employed a favorite and has
ah i g hρB but does not care for the citizen) might be reasonably happy with this situation.
Even such a ruler would prefer greater observability, better to control the rent-sharing. The
citizen gets more public goods with the current case of poor observability because there is
no extra downward distortion for the bureaucrat’s incentive compatibility, but does not get
any surplus as the bureaucrat extracts it all.
61However, consider a very benevolent ruler as in the previous section (with ρB =0a n d
ρC >> 1) who wants to beneﬁt the citizen. He can achieve such an aim with K and F
unobservable only by hiring a super-caring bureaucrat with β (1 + λC) > 1. Then the ruler
sets Ri = 0 in the knowledge that the bureaucrat is going to pass on the beneﬁt to the




2 + β [Ki −
1
2 (Ki)
2 − (1 + λC)Fi ]
= − [β (1 + λC) − 1] Fi + βK i −
1
2 (β + γi)(Ki)
2 . (A.40)
The bureaucrat chooses Fi as low as possible; I consider only the case where Fi has to be
non-negative, leaving cases of other limited liability constraints to interested readers. Now





This is the same expression (A.22) that arose in the extreme generous case of the previous
section, where K was unobservable to the ruler but F was observable. But there is a
diﬀerence; there we were limiting β to be < 1/(1+λC), and the generous ruler was enforcing
Fi = 0. Here the ruler, not being able to set Fi, must rely on the bureaucrat’s super-caring
to achieve that aim.










which is increasing in Ki in the interval [0,1], and therefore an increasing function of β.T h e
ruler’s payoﬀ is solely his evaluation of the citizen’s payoﬀ,
EU(R)=θL ρC [KL − 1
2 (KL)
2 ]+θL ρC [KL − 1
2 (KL)
2 ],
which is also increasing in β. Again we have the commonality of interest between a highly
caring bureaucrat, a highly benevolent ruler, and the citizen.
62